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DEVELOPMENT, UNDERDEVELOPMENT, AND THE STATE IN GHANA 
by Naomi Chazan 
The story of Ghana I s political economy since independence has been one of 
stagnation and deterioration. At first Ghana was unable to live up to its 
declared potential, and then, during the dismal decade between 1970 and 1980, 
it underwent a process of accelerated economic decay. 
The purpose of this essay is to expose 
of the Ghanaian political economy. First, 
inauguration of the Third Republic will be 
be made to explore various explanations 
responses and consequent adjustments made 
years will be surveyed; and, finally, the 
tions of these processes will be assessed. 
the multiple facets of the decline 
the conditions on the eve of the 
examined. Second, an attempt will 
for this situation. Third, the 
by Ghanaians during the past ten 
practical and theoretical implica-
The main contention of this analysis is that in order to comprehend the 
nature and the ramifications of the political economy of Ghana it is necessary 
to go beyond the simple investigation of the roots of underdevelopment to a 
more systematic analysis of the processes that economic stagnation and decline 
engender. By focusing more squarely on both the reasons and the responses to 
economic occurrences, it may be possible to reflect more accurately on the 
ongoing relationship between people, resources, power and the state. On this 
basis, too, significant trends for future action may be refined. 
The ensuing discussion will elaborate on the concomitant processes of the 
diminution of the political economy of the Ghanaian state on the one hand, and 
on the other, the formulation of coping mechanisms that exhibit an admixture 
of stamina, reduction in expectations, and an ingenious array of alternate 
survival techniques autonomous of state control. The dual pattern of overall 
decline and communal individual response highlights the need to derive policy 
from a simultaneous look at the causes and ongoing processes inherent in the 
Ghanaian political economy. 
The Political Economy of Ghana in 1979: An Overview 
During the decade between 1969 and 1979 the political economy of Ghana 
experienced a systematic deterioration that affected every aspect of daily 
life in the country. What was said about the situation a decade earlier was 
all the more forceful in 1979. "Only a foolish optimist would deny the dark 
realities of the moment. Despite the euphemism of the so-called 'new era,' 
Ghanaians, faced with an economic stagnation disguised as 'austerity' and 
national enfeeblement disguised as 'realism' -- remain gravely concerned lest 
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national impotence should lead to a loss of command over their own destiny as 
a nation and of their hard-earned position in international affairs. "l It 
is useful, at the outset, to outline the principal features of the state of 
the economy at the close of the period. 
Some overall indicators of economic conditions are helpful in this re-
gard. Thus, while real Gross National Product (GNP) declined 11 percent 
between 1960 and 1969, in the 1970's the GNP declined by 2 percent per annum 
(over 20 percent during the entire period) ,2 The GDP declined, per capita, 
by 3,4 percent annually. The GDP saving rate was well below 3 percent per 
year. In other words, the economy was slipping downhill on a steady course 
throughout this period. 
Inflation averaged between 70 and 100 percent annually during this time 
frame, In 1979 alone inflation reached 116 percent. Food prices were up by 
450 percent and consumer prices rose by 200 percent. Domestic prices rose by 
a factor of 14, export prices by a factor of 2.5.3 These prices affected 
expenditures in all spheres. The annual budget deficits fluctuated between 21 
and 57 percent in the period between 1973 and 1978, with the 1978-79 deficit 
standing at over¢ 2 billion. At the same time, however, government expendi-
tures rose by 42.8 percent each year during this period (from¢ 738 million to 
¢ 4,390 million). The outlay on the civil service alone was estimated at i 
540 million a year, and this figure excluded operating allowances, fringe 
benefits, and other accompanying costs.4 The way to deal with this problem 
was to increase the money supply. Between 1965 and 1969 the money supply rose 
by only 2 percent each year. During the Busia years it went up to 7.5 percent 
p.a.; under the SMC it escalated to 80 percent p.a., or by 675 percent through-
out the period of military overrule. 5 At the same time the rate of exchange 
became so unrealistic as to bear almost no resemblance to the actual state of 
the economy (the black market exchange rate was perhaps six to eight times the 
formal rate). The gross imbalance in external accounts was supplemented by a 
growing recurring debt. As of December 1979 the internal debt was ¢ 6.41 
billion and the external debt reached¢ 3.6 billion. The country was i 1,190 
million in arrears on debt repayment.6 These trends are summarized in Table 
I. 
The pattern of Ghana's underdevelopment since Nkrumah's demise has there-
fore been systematic and consistent despite shifts in policy approach, formu-
lation and implementation. Moreover, regardless of changing attitudes on the 
role of the state in the economy, the relative proportion of state expendi-
tures in the budget had risen steadily. Economic policy and action came to 
reflect less of a concern with a broad range of interests, and a greater 
preoccupation with primarily economic matters. Even within this narrow frame, 
interest focused predominantly on state-related needs, to the detriment of 
more broadly cast topics of economic growth or development. It appears that 
the political economy of successive Ghanaian governments came to center more 
and more efforts around issues of concern to fewer and fewer Ghanaians. 
The pattern of contraction of spheres of control and of inflation in 
state-linked economic endeavors is borne out in a sectoral analysis. From an 
economy based on cash-cropping, trade, and incipient industrialization, the 
bases of the economy were systematically reduced on all fronts. The produc-
tive sectors' output declined in virtually every area. Besides the oft-
repeated drop in cocoa production (see Table II), timber exports, also, 
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plunged during the decade under review. Manufacturing was down to one-third 
of capacity, and mining income, though theoretically on the rise, was also 
running at a loss. Certain local, subsistence-rooted agricultural activities 
were, however, on the rise. Fishing and food production showed some gains. 
Thus, the state-related economic sectors were evincing a deficit at the same 
time as other spheres were showing a gradual improvement. (For a summary see 
Table III.) 7 
The picture of the Ghanaian economy from the sectoral perspective, besides 
the reiteration of the overall decline evident in the gross general indica-
tors, highlights other concomitant trends. Here, again, the most serious 
deterioration occurred in sectors most closely allied to the state nexus. The 
resurgence of the subsistence economy and petty trading was a reversion to 
economic: activities outside the reach of state control. In other words, what 
seemed to be taking place was a c:onc:omi tant process of governmental salience 
coupled with ineffectiveness (with a marked decline in the capacity of state 
institutions), at the same time as individual economic: efforts were burgeoning 
beyond the control of the state.8 
These patterns of a downhill plunge of the economy, the reduction of 
spheres of governmental concern, and the expansion of areas beyond governmen-
tal control were palpably mirrored in the emergence of new types of inequali-
ties, which heretofore may have been subsumed in wider processes, and the 
pronounced exacerbation of existing ones. Urban-rural differences, which had 
always been marked, were still evident. 9 But while the relative standing of 
urban and rural areas seemed not to change substantially, urban depression 
grew noticeably. The ability of urban workers to maintain their prior stand-
ard of living was reduced. At the same time rural-rural differences also were 
on the rise, as income differentials in this setting grew in conjunction with 
the renewed interests of entrepreneurs in farming. Even within the salaried 
portion, differences in income became a cause for industrial unrest and worker 
revolt.IO Thus spatial, class, and regional inequalities came to the fore. 
The latter, much like the urban-rural differential, took the dual form of even 
greater distinctions between the richer and the poorer regions, and the rela-
tive stagnation in the standard of living of the richer regions. "The rela-
tively disadvantaged subregions, which exhibit lower levels of demands as well 
as lower expectations of support, will currently allow the central government, 
whose leadership and action· is preferred, greater latitude in meeting their 
development claims. As a consequence, central authorities are in a better 
position to 'satisfic:e' (or minimize) in their policies towards the relatively 
disadvantaged than towards the relatively advantaged subregions."11 
If underdevelopment may be manifested by both scarcities and relative 
inequalities, the increase in the latter during the past decade added further 
grist to the mill of Ghana's depressed economy at the close of the 1969-1979 
dec:ade.12 But if an attempt is made to go to the root of the problem of 
Ghana's economic: stagnation, then not only the inequality, but the relative 
depression of the superior partners of the spatial, class, and regional equa-
tions is symptomatic: of the real difficulties involved. 
For the average Ghanaian, the standard of life and the quality of life 
deteriorated. Not only did real income decline by an average of 18 percent 
during the decade, but services deteriorated even more. Hospitals could no 
longer provide drugs or adequate medical services. Urban water supplies were 
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erratic. Power availability in areas where it had been established became 
haphazard. Roads fell into disrepair and during certain seasons were impas-
sable. Infant mortality rates were on the rise.13 The general perception 
of Ghanaians was that they were subjected to greater discomforts than at any 
time before. Crime was on the rise, armed robberies and muggings increased, 
and personal safety was at an all-time low .14 If the unavailability of 
goods had previously been a derivative of income, by the end of the decade it 
had become a disincentive for participation in the formal economy. The 
perception of well-being, a function of a reaction to national government 
measures, was lower than it had been before. People thought that they were 
worse off than they had been in the past, and more to the point, were pessi-
mistic about future prospects.15 
The pattern that emerges, then, is one of a steady downward spiral charac-
terized by a reduction of spheres of control of the state's political economy. 
This process was highlighted by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness in state-
related enterprises, by growing inequalities coupled by peculiar forms of 
stagnation of relatively advantaged segments, and by an overriding atmosphere 
of pessimism and despair fueled by contact with the government. Despite vast 
differences in stated policy objectives, actual policy decisions, and manners 
of implementation, a negative constituency evolved during the past decade. 
While the emphases in this process have alternated between the civilian regime 
of the second republic and the military governments that followed it,16 the 
fact remains that the outcomes have remained by and large persistent, nega-
tive, and somewhat mysteriously predictable. 
Indeed, three main problem areas can be isolated in this dynamic. First, 
there appears to have developed a lack of consistency between policy and 
implementation. Second, a further inconsistency was formed between alterna-
tive modes of implementation and outcomes. And third, there is an almost 
inexplicable gap between the deteriorating pattern of results, the inexorable 
downward spiral of the political economy, and both varying policies and imple-
mentation practices. The reasons for these inconsistencies require close 
examination. 
Explanations for Ghana's Underdevelopment 
The causes for the deterioration of Ghana's political economy have been 
tackled from three major viewpoints, with many internal sub-variations within 
each category. These explanatory models may be roughly defined as liberal-
pragmatic, dependency-rooted, and Marxist, although the possibility exists of 
weaving in explications from all three of these outlooks. 
The Pragmatic-Liberal Approach 
Adherents of the pragmatic-liberal school rest their set of explanations 
for Ghana's economic stagnation on a series of variables related to the nature 
of policy design and implementation. According to those who propound these 
views, the first cause of Ghana's economic underdevelopment derives from poor 
policy formulation. "Sluggish growth in Ghana is due more to policy failures 
than to any inherent weakness of the economy. Ghana is fundamentally economi-
cally strong. • "17 In the period between 1969 and 1979 four main areas 
of policy failure were delineated: fiscal and monetary policy, which was 
highly inflationary; exchange rate policy; pricing policies; and policies 
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related to interest rate ceiling ,18 During the SMC period, a further two 
spheres of inadequate policy were added: the preoccupation with distribution 
as opposed to production, and the proclivity towards increased expenditures 
without any policy forethought. 
These policy failures have usually been linked to an inability or an 
unwillingness to plan the economy rationally and on a long-term basis, In 
particular, this void, it has been suggested, was most forceful for the mili-
tary, whose capacity to engage in the planning of an economy was severely 
limited,19 Others have introduced factors related to the paucity of skills, 
adequate budget, and equipment, 20 which because of the rising external debt, 
became more cumbersome as time progressed, Whether or not poor policies de-
rived from inadequate capital or technological know-how, whether these inhered 
in the composition of the ruling strata, or whether equipment and training 
problems were themselves an outgrowth of poor policies, those forwarding the 
inappropriate policy argument have concurred on the essential element that 
economic breakdown can initially be traced to inadequate planning and design. 
A second cause for the economic deterioration of Ghana, in this view, 
resulted from mismanagement, from institutional weakness, and from governmen-
tal malfunctioning, Not only were policies poorly conceived, but the institu-
tional network was inadequate to handle the process of implementation, 
The thrust of the institutional manfunctioning argument suggests that the 
problem lies not necessarily in the institutions themselves, but in how they 
operated, In this way of thinking, several fundamental difficulties have been 
identified. The most glaring and oft-repeated was one of a failure to 
develop, within the operational bureaucracy, sufficient skills geared not so 
much to theorizing, as to implementing, In other words, the stagnation of the 
economy was not necessarily a result of lack of technology, but of lack of 
technical know-how, Ghana has been able to boast of a high level of skilled 
manpower, But all too often, these trained personnel have had to call on 
outside assistance to carry out their programs or to maintain gains achieved 
in the past. The difficulty in translating technology into practice has 
therefore, it has been propounded, severely hampered many efforts at allevi-
ating or improving the state of the economy, 
Closely linked to this issue, and in fact deriving from it, have been 
problems of a functionally insupportable work ethic. The lackadaisical 
attitude to work schedules in government offices, the frequent absences, the 
over-staffing of positions, have been seen as a significant reason for the 
cumbersome, time-consuming, and exceedingly low rates at which bureaucratic 
work has proceeded. These patterns prevailed throughout the governmental 
apparatus during most of this period. Even at the highest rungs, the amount 
of time dissipated on long siestas, extravagant (and lengthy) meals, or on 
opening ceremonies of one sort or another were detrimental to an efficient 
functioning of the bureaucracy. In particular, given the need for virtually 
all senior government members to appear in concert at functions, some observ-
ers have wondered about how the institutions were able to operate at all.21 
Another aspect of the problematic work ethic has been an avoidance of 
positions in the rural areas, or, as it is derogatorily referred to among 
Ghanaian bureaucrats, the bush. Such assignments have been viewed as diffi-
cult, unrewarding, and an impediment to personal mobility since they remove 
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the incumbent from the center of activity in Accra. The reluctance to serve 
away from the capital has also been tied to the general unwillingness, parti-
cularly of senior technocrats, to oversee or directly supervise the implemen-
tation of work. The aversion to direct contact with projects added another 
dimension to the problem of the smooth operation of the governmental machin-
ery .22 
The problem of institutional malfunctioning was further exacerbated by the 
internal structure of authority and decision-making procedures in the various 
ministries. On the one hand, the tendency towards over-centralization within 
the bureaucracy, observers have suggested, constituted a very real obstacle to 
efficient decision-making. Even the most minute details were submitted to 
Accra for approval, and at times operations were held up for days while the 
appropriate authority was sought out and his imprimatur received. The proce-
dural difficulty became particularly acute as time progressed, because commu-
nications became more difficult, and the processes therefore prolonged.23 
The need for some autonomy or decentralization of key enterprises was widely 
recognized at the close of the decade. But proposals for decentralization 
were often countered by observations that part of the acute procedural diffi-
culties were a result of the inability to control the governmental apparatus. 
Instances of bureaucratic inability to force compliance of directives inter-
nally, let alone on the scale of the population at large, were legion. This 
lack of penetrative capability, coupled as it was with overcentralization, 
ground most activity to a halt by the waning years of the 1970's.24 
The problems of mismanagement -- of technical drawbacks, skewed norms of 
bureaucratic behavior, and disruptive procedures of bureaucratic organization, 
in this perspective, marred any real efforts to implement those policies that 
had been formulated with some care. The difficulties resulting from these 
factors, at all levels of the administrative apparatus, were further high-
lighted when equipment became scarce and commodities in short supply. Short-
ages that may have been somewhat alleviated by proper distribution were in 
fact accentuated, indeed even caused, by the inadequacies of institutional 
operations. 
While the problems of Ghana's economic deterioration, from this pragmatic-
liberal viewpoint, may be neatly explained by the combination of poor policy 
design and implementation, most proponents of this position have also added a 
third major cause for Ghana's strained economic condition: corruption. During 
the Busi a years, the extent of corruption in government circles was much 
greater than had appeared perhaps on the surface. The Anin commission set up 
by the NRC found extensive evidence of malfeasance at all rungs of the admin-
istration during that period. But the NRC/SMC itself was by no means clear of 
corruption, and after 1975 charges of systemic corruption appeared almost 
daily. The accusations brought against Acheampong himself and his family were 
indicative of the rampant corruption that existed at the time.25 In 1975, 
for example, the then Air Force Chief Charles Beausoleil and Chief of Defence 
Laurence Okai were implicated in the Briscoe affair.26 Rumors of connec-
tions between Lebanese businessmen and the SMC were rife. Through the 
unfettered use of unnumbered import licenses and supplier credits, as well as 
individual bribes, the governmental apparatus was ridden with corruption.27 
By 1975 corruption permeated every sphere of life, and its prevalence had made 
bribery, embezzlement, and larceny an everyday occurrence. 28 The Anin com-
mission recommended the creation of a permanent anti-bribery commission and 
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constant supervision of malpractices in the governmental apparatus. But the 
SMC itself was unwilling to carry through these suggestions. "The Government 
cannot claim to have been fair and unbiased in its distribution of the national 
cake. The Ghana Chamber of Commerce has always asked that those issued import 
licenses should have their names published with the amount against their 
names, but the government has never been able to do this just because selected 
people have had more than their fair share. If this allegation is denied, 
then we challenge the government to come up with a list of import license 
allocation for the people to see."29 
The prevalence of bribery and corruption, in short, was rarely at issue. 
Differences revolved around the extent and the levels of corruption or its 
roots. Some people have suggested that the degree vacillated markedly between 
the Busia and SMC phases, while others have claimed that corruption was uni-
formly on the rise throughout the decade.3O The purposes of such a debate 
are, however, somewhat elusive. The general consensus has always been that 
something must be done about corruption -- either through re-education or 
through a revamping of the entire system. "While Ghanaians may be dubious 
about the efficacy of particular governmental efforts to eliminate corruption, 
those writing about the subject seem convinced that such efforts must con-
tinue. "32 
The controversy over the underpinnings of corruption is thus important in 
finding means to eradicate the phenomenon. On this question opinions have 
been divided. While most analysts are in agreement that corruption serves the 
function of creating a link with a person in authority (or who has access to 
resources) and indicates a special form of deference (or clientilism), there 
has been little unanimity on the reasons for the growing corruption.33 One 
school of thought has argued that corruption is a vivid indication of the 
persistence of traditional norms, which conflict with the requirements of 
secular life, and that the conscious preservation of traditional structures 
militates against its obsolescence.34 .Another has argued forcefully for the 
location of the problem in situational and historical forces imposed on Ghana 
by the colonial conquest, and continued through Ghana's external dependen-
cy.35 According to this viewpoint, the problem of corruption will persist, 
since it has a certain functional utility as long as structural exigencies are 
not removed .36 .And finally, weakness of character has been forwarded as an 
alternative explanation. "Poverty impels men not only to tolerate corruption 
but also to take advantage of it."37 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which traditional normative, 
historical, structural and/or personal factors have been involved in the 
mismanagement of the Ghanaian political economy since independence, although 
one suspects that particular instances of corrupt practices may be accounted 
for by one or a combination of these variables. Unlike the debate over the 
extent of corruption, however, that over its root causes is significant 
because it relates directly to the role of corruption in underdevelopment. If 
the position that corruption is a manifestation of, and not a cause for, 
economic poverty is accepted, then it follows that corruption may not be used 
as an explication for certain facets of economic stagnation.38 If, on the 
other hand, corruption may be ascribed to other factors, then it in itself can 
be shown to have hindered growth. As one proponent of the latter interpreta-
tion has put it: "Corruption may, under special circumstances, have some 
short-run benefits in terms of these goals [of capital formation], but as it 
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undermines the dependability of government organizations it reduces govern-
ment's capacity to respond to and control its environment and thus impedes 
political development and negatively affects the attainment of modernization 
goals."39 The majority of adherents to liberal-pragamatic explanations of 
Ghana's economic decline prefer to view corruption in these terms. They 
therefore add corruption to the poor planning and poor implementation compo-
nents of the reasons for the crisis in Ghana's political economy. 
Some scholars in this school have gone a step further and added cultural 
factors to their list of explanations. They have viewed the issues of mis-
management, malpractice, and lack of planning foresight as a function of 
cultural deterrents which are demonstrated not only in a lack of desire to 
advance (something oddly out of context in the Ghanaian setting) but more 
pointedly, in a yawning gap between rational thinking and functional thinking. 
In this view, while Ghanaians are extremely adept at discussing what they will 
not accept and what they would like to achieve, they tend to be at a loss in 
translating this 'knowing what' into a coherent set of programmatic poli-
cies. 40 This propensity, it has been suggested, has added a deep-seated 
normative obstacle to efficient functional operations. This type of explana-
tion has not yet, however, been empirically validated. In any event it is 
somewhat distasteful, even if it does attempt to delve into the underlying 
basic reasons for the peculiar forms of inefficiency that have been prevalent 
in the country in recent years. 
Beyond these factors, two specific events have been introduced by the 
adherents of this school to account for the specific problems of the 1970's. 
The first was the drought which struck Ghana during mid-decade, 41 and the 
second was the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, which caused a severe drain 
on the con try' s foreign reserves. These occurrences simply struck an addi-
tional blow to an already precarious economy. 
Although there is much internal disagreement among those lumped rather 
crudely in the category of liberal-pragmatic theorists, what unites them is 
their tendency to search for internal, primarily political, often normative 
explanations, as opposed to global, economic, or structural reasons. By 
suggesting that variables related to a shortage of capital, problems of 
technology and technical know-how, poor planning, corruption and loss of 
contro142 are at the base of Ghana's sorry economic performance, these 
analysts contend that political instability and the absence of "good" 
government underlie recurrent difficulties. By implication, too, the way to 
resolve some of these difficulties would be to stabilize the political 
situation, provide better training, and, in a sense either uplift Ghanaians, 
or assist them in bettering themselves. 
The utility of these explanations lies in the insights they give to 
understanding why food shortages were so pronounced, why debts accumulated, 
why sectoral imbalances occurred, why production and infrastructure were not 
aligned, and why mismanagement was rife throughout the bulk of the period. In 
short, this approach does assist in accounting for some inadequate policies 
and for the gap between policy and implementation. It does not, however, go 
below the surface in furnishing compelling reasons why even when efficiency 
was in evidence, the results were unimpressive. More problematically, there 
is little in these theories to aid in comprehending the gap between implemen-
tation and outcomes, or to illuminate why certain patterns persisted, regard-
less of what was actually done. 
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The Dependency Approach 
The dependency theorists have sought to develop explanations to fill this 
void, and rest their case on aq analysis of the relationship of Ghana to the 
global economy. "The middle class, like the critics from outside Ghana, takes 
up the theme that Ghana's problems are due to 'economic mismanagement' and 
thus implies that they will be resolved by a greater degree of efficacy and 
honesty. This diagnosis obscures the crucial fact that Ghana's basic economic 
problem is its legacy of colonialism, underdevelopment and dependency."43 
The dependency explanations for Ghana's continuous economic deterioration 
vary much more widely than those of the liberal-pragmatic school, as within 
their broad outlines may be found a wide array of ideological viewpoints. To 
attempt to summarize them in several words, therefore, constitutes something 
of an injustice. Nevertheless, with these hesitations in mind, some commonal-
ities may be discerned. Almost all who have adopted and/or adapted dependency 
theory concur that the chronic ills of the Ghanaian political economy may be 
traced to Ghana's structural standing at the periphery of the global capital-
ist system. Removed from the core and hindered by its narrow, agriculturally 
rooted resource base from moving into the semi-periphery, Ghana has been 
unable to overcome its unequal, subordinate position in the existing inter-
national order. 
Ghana's structural dependency, it has been contended, derives from its 
reliance on the export sector to obtain funds for its own development. The 
lack of significant internal capital accumulation, it has been posited, has 
left Ghana exposed to outside trends and fluctuations which directly affect 
the state of the economy at any given time. The external determinants of the 
Ghanaian situation are such, the argument proceeds, that much that has taken 
place in its political economy was beyond the control of any specific regime. 
On this general overview there is broad agreement among explanations based on 
dependency analysis.44 
Proponents of this approach have focused, in varying degrees, on four main 
groups of factors to further their case. The first relates to the nature of 
Ghana's export-oriented economy. In 1973, for example, cocoa accounted for 58 
percent of foreign exchange earnings; timber for 19 percent, gold 10 percent, 
and other minerals for 3.4 percent.45 In other words, given the lack of 
indigenous means for capital accumulation, Ghana has had to rely consistently 
on world prices for cocoa and some minerals. Demand for cocoa, until recently 
the single most important component of Ghana's political economy,46 is 
essentially inelastic, and earnings from a monocrop economy of Ghana's ilk 
have therefore been particularly subjected to shifts determined by the commod-
ity exchange in London. Most Ghanaian governments have been acutely aware of 
this exposure. Despite some real attempts to break the accompanying 
dependence these have proven to be inadequate, suggesting once again that 
there are severe limitations on the autonomy of action possible within such a 
structural context.47 Dependency theorists thus link the stagnation of the 
economy initially to the specific problems posed by a cocoa-based economy, and 
to the drop in export prices during the early part of the decade of the 
1970's. Since this process coincided with rising prices of imported goods and 
an escalating oil bill, Ghana found itself in severely reduced circumstances 
at the end of the decade. 
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The second set of factors derives, to a great extent, from Ghana's prob-
lematic monocrop resource base and reliance on industrial and other imports, 
and concentrates on the growing debt problem. Given the fact that export 
earnings have vacillated so unpredictably, and that world market prices 
reflected the inflationary tendencies in the industrialized economies during 
1969-1979, Ghanaian leaders, of whatever ideological bent, were forced to 
borrow money to support operating budgets. These loans usually coincided with 
falling cocoa income, and came with high rates of interest. Despite the par-
tial repudiation of debts by Acheampong and the moratorium on interest repay-
ment, essentially the debt problem has come to constitute an alternative ave-
nue for continued reliance and hence a long-term mortgaging of the Ghanian 
economy, so it has been suggested, to its foreign creditors. 48 In other 
words, the fundamental export orientation has fostered a further dependence 
for operating funds to bail out the economy, and this second form of depend-
ence in itself has limited further growth possibilities. 
Some people concerned with using dependency modes of analysis have shifted 
away from an examination of either global trends as they have affected Ghana 
or an analysis of Ghana's international debts, to a more focused attention on 
a third set of variables: those concerned with expatriate business practices 
within Ghana. These studies have sought to show the new forms that colonially 
rooted economic exploitation have taken in the country since independence 
through a better understanding of investments, capital outlays, employment 
procedures and profit expatriation of foreign business concerns. Some major 
works in this mold have dealt with large, capital-intensive projects such as 
the Volta River dam.49 Others have studied commercial concerns -- foreign 
businessmen and trading firms. 50 In both types of investigations a number 
of points are constantly reiterated. First, that efforts are made to encour-
age either the development or the consumption of products that are not needed 
by many Ghanaians. Second, these studies have underlined how expatriate con-
cerns are usually capital-intensive and do not make sufficient use of local 
labor or material.51 Third, many such endeavors have shown that these 
companies have themselves engaged in malfeasance, bribery, or circuitous 
routes that have further undermined the foundations of the economy. Fourth, 
foreign aid, dwindling in quantity, has not offset these tendencies. And, 
finally, these investigations have highlighted the detrimental effects of the 
continued neocolonial presence in Ghana. 
The manner of operation of expatriate firms in Ghana, especially during 
the past decade, has shifted the attention of some scholars to the issue of 
why, given the need to control or in some way regulate foreign activity in the 
country, efforts in this direction have been few and far between. Some observ-
ers have been satisfied with showing that the ineffectiveness of regulatory 
measures is merely another symptom of the inevitable trap that structural 
dependency sets: that given the need to attract capital investment, 
concessions have to be made which themselves have merely exacerbated the 
difficulties. Others with a more Marxist orientation have seized this oppor-
tunity to map out how external structural inequalities have been repeated 
within the country. By introducing a fourth set of variables, that related to 
social structural (or class) differentiation emanating from external struc-
tural factors, these analyses have come to concentrate more squarely on map-
ping out the origins of internal divisions, the rise of a state entrepreneurial 
class and their interconnection (collaboration) with foreign concerns.52 
They conclude that, "since independence, therefore, none of the political 
11 
regimes in control of Ghana has been both willing and able to effect a with-
drawal from the world economic system which is the basis of support both for 
the state apparatus and for the social class on which the state is based."53 
The internal class divisions fostered by the dual structure of the economy 
also assist, according to these analysts, in explicating the growth of inter-
nal inequalities. The neglect of agriculture for many years was attributed to 
the lack of political will on the part of the state leaders .54 In fact, to 
many: "the basic contradiction in the Ghanaian economy is the subordination 
of the cocoa-producing peasantry to international capitalism through the medi-
ation of the Cocoa Marketing Board ... 55 Because the state has generated a 
class whose interests are forwarded by foreign links, Ghana's dependency has 
not only been maintained, but this perpetuation has been achieved at the 
expense of the more productive sectors of rural Ghana. 
This four-fold set of factors, emphasized in a variety of manners by dif-
ferent onlookers, does combine in the creation of a fairly coherent theory for 
Ghana's underdevelopment and for its increasingly peripheral position in the 
international arena. When applied to the specifics of the 1969-1979 period, 
two somewhat separate types of analysis have been used. The Busia regime has 
been viewed as almost the prototype of neocolonialism, as the verification of 
both the inequalities and stunted development that go hand in hand with col-
laborative policies.56 At first, the Acheampong regime was applauded 
because of its disengagement inclinations. Statements such as those of Roger 
Felli ( "Today there appears to be emerging a new international order in which 
the multiplicity of small states can make certain firm demands to participate 
in determining the course of war and peace. They demand not only freedom from 
the political domination of the strong and mighty. They also demand a firm 
say in the nature of relations which must govern the international economic 
order")57 were viewed as a positive attempt to seek alternative horizontal 
strategies to the vertical dependency syndrome. The efforts of the SMC to 
enter into meaningful cooperative efforts with Third World countries, Arab 
states, and within the OAU signalled to some a continuation of this trend. In 
particular, Ghana's active participation in the planning stages of ECOWAS 
seemed to bear out this assessment. 58 When, however, the SMC experiment 
began to turn sour, interpretation in this frame varied. Some viewed 
Acheampong as merely another example of the predatory nature of the class 
preying on the Ghanaian state, whereas others tended to attribute the collaps-
ing economy to pressures brought by outside forces on any real efforts to 
withdraw from the stranglehold of the world system. Neither of these explana-
tions, however, is especially convincing without reference to some of the ele-
ments discussed by the liberal-oriented analysts of Ghana's underdevelopment. 
The increasingly heterogeneous school of dependency theorists thus tends 
to view the pragmatically highlighted problems of poor planning, implementa-
tion, and corruption not as causes in themselves, but more as indicators of a 
set of problems emanating from Ghana's precarious standing at the extremity of 
the world economic nexus. The nature of the structural changes in Ghana's 
economy since the colonial intrusion,59 the growing indebtedness, the con-
stant and pernicious foreign interference, and internal inequalities are all 
outgrowths (of varying significance) of this process. The reasons for this 
condition, it is posited, lie in historical factors set in the colonial incur-
sion which simultaneously integrated the colonial economy of Ghana into the 
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world capitalist system and resulted in its development as a peripheral capi-
talist economy; and at the same time brought about the denuding of Ghana's own 
capitalist potential.6O In stressing this type of perspective, underdevel-
opment over a long period becomes the root cause of particular political 
upheavals and economic crises. By placing special emphasis on external eco-
nomic and structural factors, adherents of this group of explanations have 
striven to make explicit the connection between the lack of internal capital 
accumulation, external vulnerability, and endemic inequality. To them, 
resources, their origins and their uses, are the key to understanding the 
economic predicament of Ghana's second decade. 
The corrective prescriptions that stem from such an analysis have usually 
gone in two distinct directions. On the one hand, the need for self-reliance, 
indeed withdrawal from further dependency, has been encouraged.61 In order 
to effect such a movement, it has also been suggested that internal structural 
changes must follow. "In the last analysis, if the state is to play an appro-
priate development role, it will be necessary to rebuild the political appara-
tus so that the government represents those groups which stand to gain from 
the changes that have to be made. "62 On the other hand, dependency theo-
rists have advocated greater efforts towards changing the structural align-
ments inhering in the present global system. They therefore have pushed for 
more significant concessions from the industrialized world, and suggest that 
without major changes in the global system, countries like Ghana will not be 
able to achieve a modicum of development. Dependency approaches thus propound 
either changing the world or attempting to ignore it. They have been geared, 
therefore, to alternative strategies for coping with the international context. 
By focusing on underdevelopment and its sources, the dependency school 
adds new dimensions to an understanding of Ghana's economic malaise. Indeed, 
it lays the foundation for comprehending the more deep-seated, chronic diffi-
culties that have confronted Ghanaian state leaders since independence. Spe-
cifically, the employment of certain facets of this approach can account for 
the inability of successive governments to penetrate to the point of produc-
tion. It can also assist in dealing with the growth of the public sector, and 
with the incapacity to bridge the gap between consumption standards and actual 
availability of goods, and it reiterates forcefully the background for Ghana's 
structural dependency. In short, dependency theories, by stressing resources 
and inequalities, are critical in unveiling the root causes for the persistent 
gap between what was done, executed in fact, and outcomes. By inserting the 
dependency-derived suggestion that much of the political economy has been 
beyond the control of the state, it is possible to furnish some explanations 
for the noticeable lack of relationship between certain events and government-
initiated programs. 
But this set of ideas also contains problems of its own. There is no 
necessary correlation between poverty and dependency. The specificity of 
Ghana's resources accounts, within this structural situation, for Ghana's 
impoverished state. Moreover, placing Ghana in a certain position structur-
ally does not necessarily imply that a specific type of relationship ensues. 
The dangers of inferring a relationship through classificatory schemes is rife 
in the dependency mode of analysis. Furthermore, by predetermining actions on 
the basis of market trends, such theories may both overlook non-economic 
factors and limit the behavioral autonomy of the actors involved. In a very 
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real sense, the indiscriminate utilization of dependency notions may substi-
tute structure for theory, and thus obscure significant processes and relation-
ships that are actually taking place,63 
By avoiding specifics, problems peculiar to given places and times are 
left largely unaccounted for. In the case of Ghana during the second decade 
of independence, three main issues remained unresolved in the dependency view-
point, First, this approach is not especially helpful in explaining why self-
reliance policies, introduced by Acheampong, were often counterproductive. 
Recourse must be had here to more endogenous ideas. Second, these notions 
cloud the fact that foreign investment was not only actively sought out during 
this period, but actually helped to prop up the failing economy. But these 
difficulties pale in comparison with the fact that externally-derived explana-
tions simply cannot explain well the consistent, downward spiral of Ghana's 
economy during this decade, regardless of vacillating global trends. In fact, 
the world price of cocoa reached an all-time high during the latter part of 
the 1970's -- precisely the time when Ghana's economic performance was at its 
nadir, If indeed Ghana's economy is so tied to occurrences on the inter-
national scene, it would stand to reason that internal economic trends would 
reflect fluctuations elsewhere. This did not happen, and dependency theory 
leaves the analyst helpless in confronting this reality. 
It may be possible to account for the steady downward trend of the econ-
omy, for the constant breach between both policy and implementation and 
outcomes, by using a mixture of ideas put forth by dependency and liberal 
observers. Thus, one may suggest that Acheampong's malfeasance precisely when 
world market prices peaked didn't allow Ghana to benefit from international 
trends,64 The combination in itself is satisfactory and convincing to a 
large degree, 
The Marxist Approach 
Some onlookers, however, have attempted to go deeper into the problem, 
and, through the introduction of Marxist concepts, to suggest alternate 
explanations for this paradox. Two main addenda have been proposed in this 
regard. First, by using class analysis, it may be suggested that the downhill 
plunge of Ghana's political economy is related to the gradual consolidation of 
a state-based bourgeoisie that has systematically eaten away at any real gains 
achieved by the actual producers, The process has been facilitated, secondly, 
by the concomitant entrenchment of capitalist modes of production at the state 
level. These two factors, then, can account for the strangulation of the 
economy, and for the growing unrest of the peasantry and the working class, 
Surprisingly, Marxist analysts have not proliferated in the Ghanaian poli-
tical studies scene, and examples of these explanations are very sparse 
indeed,65 The few who have engaged in such an approach have sought to show 
how internal class divisions have been exacerbated to such an extent in recent 
years that the only available remedy is violent upheaval aimed at changing the 
social order, But these types of analysis have been hampered by the fact that 
it is precisely the middle classes and the advantaged areas that have been 
affected most negatively by recent processes. In addition, Marxist analysis 
has tended to center on distribution, but not on the problem of lack of pro-
duction, This rather simplistic approach as applied to the Ghanaian context 
should not obscure the utility of this form of analysis, when used with care. 
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As one Marxist observer has suggested: "Instead of generalizing pointlessly 
or pursuing the consciousness of a social formation that has not been speci-
fied, we will do better to examine the responses of ruling classes and 
ordinary cultivators to the expansion of world markets and the ways in which 
these struggles have shaped different systems of production, class structure 
and political conflicts. "66 
The three main approaches to the analysis of the reasons for Ghana's 
economic deterioration progressively delve deeper into root causes for the 
situation at the close of the 1970's. When taken selectively'and in concert, 
they do furnish viable explications for various facets of the problem. 
Although emanating from vastly divergent ideological stances, these proffered 
reasons are neither incompatible nor logically unrelated. 
But nevertheless, even the combination of these explanations leaves a 
sense of unease that perhaps some factor is missing or understated in all of 
the main approaches. The underlying assumption in the various schools is that 
the state, for a variety of reasons, has been unable to command satisfactorily 
the political economy of the country. The suggested prescriptions are all 
aimed at rectifying the fragility of the state apparatus in one way or another. 
But perhaps this presumption itself requires some further rumination. If the 
government alone were responsible for the decline (as the pragmatic liberal 
school suggests) or if outside forces in consort with state-linked classes 
must bear the blame (as the dependency school argues), then the unit of analy-
sis remains the state or the state as it relates to external variables. What 
is lacking in this approach is any careful scrutiny of the central position of 
the state vis-a-vis the society it purports to reflect. In other words, there 
is a supposition that government may reflect society or outside interests, but 
not enough attention has been paid to the governmental impact on society as a 
reason for (and not simply an outgrowth of) Ghana's underdevelopment.67 
If the inability of the state to cope is also, beyond the explanations 
already forwarded in these pages, a function of the receding centrality of the 
Ghanaian state to the internal political economy processes, then indigenous 
factors are not only resurrected as an integral part of the quest for under-
standing, but certain previously inadequately explained patterns begin to 
assume a different meaning. It is suggested, therefore, that by shifting the 
level of analysis to the state in its relationship to internal Ghanaian proc-
esses, we may be able to overcome the malaise deriving from the over-reliance 
on the multiplicity of explanations now in vogue. 
The steady, downhill plunge of the Ghanaian economy, from this perspec-
tive, may also be attributed to the gradual erosion of the state's hold over 
critical social and economic processes in the country. The material bases of 
the country have depended, throughout the past century, on an admixture of 
land and labor-intensive activities, mixed with a strong independent trading 
component. The colonial state was able to gain control over certain of these 
forces, as long as those involved in the state domain were able to profit from 
this aggregation. But since independence, and particularly during the past 
decade, land has come once again to replace the state as the main source of 
social stratification and power accumulation (its prominence as one source of 
these processes throughout has rarely been assailed) .68 Given this trend, 
the inability of the successive regimes of the 1970's to penetrate to the 
point of production becomes clearer. So, too, does the emphasis at the state 
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level on augmenting the public sector, and the incremental divorcing of the 
state from the task of assuring the standard of living of the bulk of 
Ghanaians, The Ghanaian economy is therefore no longer as susceptible to 
government control and direction as it may have been in previous years,69 
The undermining of the internal vitality of state power is therefore 
related to its ability to extract and then redistribute resources. The uses 
of power have been limited by the dwindling supply of resources (material, 
symbolic-normative, communal-solidarity and coercive) at the disposal of the 
state, As time has progressed, the removal of the state from ongoing modes of 
production and social-structural processes has further impeded its ability to 
command the direction of events, Herein may be the most significant root 
cause for the lack of fluctuation, the consistent downward spiral, of the 
Ghanaian political economy. 
Indeed, the main characteristics of the record of the 1970' s are further 
illuminated by the addition of this factor. First, the tendency to deal more 
exclusively with purely economic and state-survival-oriented policies is 
thereby elucidated, So, too, is the deterioration in the public sector which 
was not of necessity replicated in the areas beyond the state domain, Third, 
the nature of inequalities, and the relative depression of state-linked 
classes and regions, is also clarified as a sign of the fragility of the state 
apparatus in relationship to ongoing social and economic processes. And, 
finally, the discrepancy between the plight of the economy and the situation 
of many Ghanaians (in terms of standards of living, but not perhaps in quality 
of life as reflected in increased services) may be explained. 
l'he introduction of the position of the state in relationship to social, 
economic and political processes, and the proposition that the underdevelop-
ment of the country is also a result of the loss of control of the state not 
only sheds light on certain inscrutable aspects of the experience of the 
second decade, but is also suggestive of further avenues of exploration, 
First, there appears to be a differentiation between the condition of the 
Ghana political economy and that of Ghanaians. This must be pursued. Second, 
there is a very strong suggestion that people do not subsist in an economic 
vacuum and that they have devised means of their own, separate from those of 
the state, to deal with their environment, And third, internal variations and 
the ability to predict ongoing processes may be linked not only to the expli-
cations of the condition of Ghana's economic deterioration, but to theory 
revolving around the shifting relationship between the people and the state in 
Ghana during the 1969-1979 period, 70 The responses, substitutes, and mecha-
nisms in this informal, elusive sector of the Ghana political economy demand 
more careful scrutiny, 
Ghanaian Responses and Adjustments to Economic Deterioration 
Four main strategies of survival were evolved by Ghanaians to deal with 
the exigencies of the political economy during the 1970's. These included 
various forms of coping, responding and adjusting to the environment which 
exhibited an array of ingenuity, creativity, and manipulation reflective of an 
intriguing admixture of innovation and necessity, 
The first survival technique was 
coping with the deteriorating situation 
the suffer-manage strategy aimed at 
within the bounds of existing norms of 
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behavior. In real terms, this technique has meant that people resigned them-
selves to a declining standard of living and, at most, tried to manage in the 
circumstances. The reconciliation to a reduced living style took a number of 
forms during the 1969-1979 phase. In the first instance, people reconciled 
themselves to shortages on all fronts. The most critical, and already oft-
repeated, scarcity was that of food. The inability to gain access to food, 
and even to assume that a daily meal of decent caloric intake would be 
presented, was the prime shift in this strategy. Food scarcities were accom-
panied by shortages of other commodities (batteries, razor blades, soap, 
toothpaste, and so on). On another front, people adjusted to the limitations 
on access to spare parts. A car without a battery could not run, and there-
fore fell into disrepair. A peeling wall could not be painted and therefore 
was left to decay. A broken door handle simply did not get repaired. And, 
inevitably, this strategy also implied a deterioration of expectations vis-a-
vis key services. Medical services went down because of lack of drugs and 
increasingly unsanitary conditions. Water supplies became more erratic. 
Driving became more hazardous and drivers began to follow a zig-zag route to 
avoid the gaping potholes. Candles became a valued commodity to deal with 
electrical stoppages. 71 The suffer-manage technique, therefore, required a 
real reduction of consumer styles. 
A second aspect of the suffer-manage technique involved a tangible shift 
in the use of time of those involved in this means of coping. Instead of 
devoting major portions of the day to productive activity, people diverted 
much of their energies to locating basic commodities and cajoling those who 
controlled them to allocate to them some portion of these valued goods. The 
amount of time required to acquire the most basic of necessities in itself 
therefore became a further drain on the capacity to work. 
This trend set in motion a third facet of the suffer-manage syndrome: the 
redistribution of patterns of income expenditure. From a rather standard 
expense list consisting of food, clothing, and education, housing and trans-
portation costs, more money was allotted not only to essential foodstuffs, 
but, significantly in light of the previous point, to transportation to find 
basic commodities. 72 People were also forced to adjust to the fact that no 
surplus income would be available, and that intake in any event could not 
cover the cost of living. 
The features of this strategy, however, also included more than merely 
sophisticated suffering devices. The fourth component meant that people 
attempted to find ways to augment their incomes. Housewives began to culti-
vate vegetable gardens and to seek remunerative jobs. Crafts that had once 
been bobbies developed into cottage industries. 73 People took on additional 
jobs to increase income, and even children began to work for money in order to 
move from suffering to some kind of managing. 
Underlying these techniques, however, was a fifth characteristic that 
(regardless of efforts to countermand the situation) captures the essence of 
the suffer-manage strategy: the growing tendency to voice dissatisfaction, to 
point out the problematics of survival, in short, to complain. Indeed, in 
this mode the awareness of the endurance, the recognition of the fact that 
people were suffering and that the margin for managing was limited, became an 
integral part of the overall strategy.74 The verbalization not so much of 
despair but of decay, became symptomatic of this entire mode of handling the 
situation. 
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The suffer-manage syndrome was largely, if not exclusively, an urban phe-
nomenon. It touched upon urban dwellers, and more specifically on the more 
advantaged portion of city inhabitants. The middle class segment of the urban 
population were the most significant group to adopt this strategy. They were 
the ones who had seen their own successes dwindle, their income pegged to 
salaries that were taxed heavily, and their ability to find alternatives most 
limited since they, more than perhaps any other group, were linked to the 
state economy. The dependence on the government (for direct income, distribu-
tion or business) necessitated the adaptation of a limited range of choices as 
expressed in the suffer-manage continuum.75 
The stamina embodied in the suffer-manage scheme is an interesting reflec-
tion of the patience threshold that many Ghanaians exhibited at this time in 
the economic sphere. In fact, to offset the decline in living standards, many 
people resorted, on the political front, to intensive opposition action. Few 
Ghanaians, however, were content to merely cope, and this strategy response, 
though undergone by many, was rarely used alone. Most people combined it with 
one of three other substitute or alternative techniques. 
The second technique for survival may best be described as one of escape. 
Those who were able to find positions elsewhere began to leave the country, or 
those temporarily out of the country chose to delay their return. The problem 
of outward migration began to become acute by the end of the decade. Two 
groups of people were involved. The first consisted of skilled, highly edu-
cated manpower that opted for jobs elsewhere. The situation in the universi-
ties and secondary schools was reflective of this trend. By the end of the 
decade some departments in the University of Ghana at Legon had lost most of 
their senior faculty, were staffed at only one-third of capacity, and were in 
a position of having to rely increasingly on expatriate replacements. 
Secondary schools, too, were losing teachers at a worrying rate. What was 
true of education was also true in other professions, most notably medicine 
and the sciences. At a second level, there was also emigration of urban unem-
ployed and technical labor seeking positions in industries and service sectors 
in neighboring countries. Thus, members of both the middle class and the 
urban proletariat, if the possibility presented itself, opted for getting off 
what was regarded as a sinking ship. The target areas of Ghanaian migration 
were the more affluent states of the West African littoral, most notably 
Nigeria and to a lesser degree the Ivory Coast. These two countries alone 
have accounted for literally hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians in recent 
years, and are more than willing to absorb Ghana's highly trained human 
resources. 76 Other Ghanaians, able to find suitable positions in Europe or 
North America, have considered themselves particularly fortunate. 
The reasoning for this escape strategy is not difficult to understand. 
One university lecturer's account suffices to capture the thrust of the 
trend. "It is all demoralising especially if there is no light at the end of 
the tunnel. So even if I've decided to stay till my sabbatical I'm 
doing so under considerable emotional strain and physical drain. It is not 
fun. It is almost suicidal to decide to stay. If you have a big family like 
mine, it is genocide -- almost -- for the poor kids; because you can't meet 
their emotional and nutritional needs. It is plain bad -- rotten."77 
The escapist survival technique has, once again, been concentrated among 
urban populations of various class affiliations. These people, as has been 
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indicated, are the most closely linked to the so-called capital-intensive 
sectors of the economy, and hence the ones most directly affected by the 
fluctuations in the economy as a whole. The employment of the escape tech-
nique, therefore, has deep roots in Ghana since independence. Indeed, in 1963 
an exit permit bill was passed in order to stem the drain of prominent people 
who were leaving the country in what then appeared to be alarming numbers.78 
But by the late 1970's what had once been a stream was turning into a verita-
ble flood. Its effects were felt not only in Ghana (on the standard mostly of 
the services and manufacturing sectors), but also in nearby countries (xeno-
phobia, increasing violence, and the like), and most perniciously on the sense 
of self of many Ghanaians and on their national pride. 
The second survival technique was therefore outward-oriented in nature and 
not unreasonable in the circumstances. The deleterious effects that this 
movement has had on the economy is just one ramification of the exodus of some 
of Ghana's most important labor and intellectual reserves. It is also a very 
palpable indication of the real trans-national character of class formation 
processes in a situation of a severe reduction in material resources over a 
short period of time. All in all, the escape technique may be viewed as one 
manifestation of the removal of important groups from the state. 
Not all people have selected, however, to remove themselves physically 
from the country. Most have remained. Of these some have chosen to utilize a 
third survival strategy devised in essence to work within but to override the 
system. Fundamentally the beat-the-system strategy has consisted of construc-
ting a parallel economy to the formal one which breeds on the formal sector, 
diverts its resources to the informal economy, and sets out to manipulate the 
state in order to serve the needs of diverse groups of persons within its 
boundaries. This scheme has generally come to be known in Ghana as kalabule 
-- or malpractice of various sorts involving an attempt to skirt existing 
controls or to knowingly defraud in order to maximize one's own gains. 
Four main types of kalabule have developed in recent years. The first, 
and perhaps most noted in the literature, involved the proliferation of 
smuggling of Ghanaian products across the borders and of manufactured goods 
back into Ghana. The most important type of smuggling was of agricultural 
goods -- rice and cocoa. The rice smuggling, poorly documented, crossed the 
Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Togo boundaries in the northern portions of the 
country. Cocoa smuggling has been far more systematic and widespread. It has 
been estimated that 150,000 men working 150 days a year were needed to smuggle 
the amounts of cocoa that traversed the borders during the past decade. 79 
The cocoa-smuggling trade is organized trade aimed primarily at the Togolese 
and Ivorian cocoa markets. In 1970/71, for example, 573,565 long tons left 
Ghana and appeared as part of the export figures of Togo and the Ivory 
Coast.80 By the close of the decade internal production had dropped consid-
erably, and the proportions of smuggling, if possible, had escalated. One 
observer suggested that fully four-fifths of the Volta region production in 
1980 was either smuggled to Togo81 or left unharvested in favor of food-
crops. The staggering extensiveness of cocoa smuggling also is suggestive of 
the degree of collusion between smugglers and customs and police officials. 
While smuggling of 
illegal exportation has 
mately 12-15 percent of 
cocoa was particularly rife, a certain amount of 
been common in the mining sphere as well. Approxi-
the heavily monitored gold output was smuggled out 
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regularly during the past decade, and a similar proportion of diamonds.82 
The extent of timber smuggling has yet to be estimated. All told, a good 
portion of Ghana's key exports were siphoned out of the formal economy through 
smuggling activities. 
Closely related to smuggling was a second manifestation of the beat-the-
system strategy: hoarding or black marketeering. The sources of the goods 
(carded and then put out on the market were either Ghana's own rural areas, or 
from abroad via neighboring states (often purchased with profits from smug-
gling activities). The petty traders in key urban areas, who have controlled 
the markets for many years, were those directly engaged in selective hoarding 
(when control prices were low) or black marketeering (when certain goods 
became practically unavailable). The market women (mammies) have often been 
associated with these malpractices, and isolated as the main figures responsi-
ble for determining the extent and the price of black market goods. 83 These 
women, however, have neither been the exclusive actors in this part of the 
i: internal economy, nor were they necessarily the originators of the forms it 
-took. Like others, they engaged in hoarding and price manipulations in order 
,to maximize profits when legal sources of income were severely constrained.84 
The process of controlling exchange in the non-formal sector required 
access to scarce commodities and means of bringing these goods to the market. 
Transport monopolies (some may claim Mafia-like networks) proliferated at this 
time, and were geared not only to extracting goods from rural areas, but also 
controlling the prices and the quantities of certain goods.85 Thus, in some 
instances (although by no means as a rule) the beat-the-system technique 
shifted from an individually motivated strategy into an organized, elaborated 
method of creating a substitute marketing system which took full advantage of 
the inadequacies of formal mechanisms. By the middle of the decade, however, 
there were some signs that producers were turning to marketing themselves in 
order to take advantage of the profits to be found in the trade side of their 
work, and that, in fact, local wholesalers attached to local markets were 
expanding their activities.86 The rearrangement of marketing prices and 
directions, let alone prices and goods, thus became an important facet of the 
beat-the-system kalabule economy. 
A third form that these activities took consisted of corruption and 
embezzlement whose main purpose was to divert monies and goods from the formal 
to the informal economy. At its most superficial levels this could be demon-
strated by the appearance of grains given as food aid, in the original sacks, 
on the markets at well above control prices. 87 But more often this form 
meant the redirection of state funds into private pockets, the misuse of 
import licenses, and the abuse of bureaucratic regimens in order to augment 
personal income. The proliferation of those more sophisticated forms of 
malfeasance, unlike smuggling and hoarding, required some proximity to the 
state apparatus and the devising of often ingenious means by those on the 
inside to bypass its regulations. These actions have been carefully recorded 
by the various commissions of enquiry, and were monitored also by opposition 
groups during the Busia and SMC periods. 
The fourth element of the beat-the-system strategy entailed the creation 
of crime networks, usually by urban unemployed, who not only preyed on the 
traders, but also enhanced their income through systematic burglaries, armed 
robberies, and muggings. Organized violence of a mafia gang type thus came 
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into increased prominence as another, modified form, that the beat-the-system 
syndrome assumed during the 1970's. 
The four main manifestations of the construction of the informal economy 
during these years encompassed a broad array of people in both urban and rural 
areas who were in some way connected with the cash economy;. In contrast to 
the first two strategies of survival (suffer-manage and escape), the third 
strategy took place at the interstices of the subsistence and market sectors, 
at the point of linkage between the rural and urbal areas. The key concern of 
those involved was with exchange of goods, and the management of the flow of 
goods to certain segments of the population -- almost always to the detriment 
of state revenues. 
The widespread nature of this strategy by those able to operate in the 
formal and informal sector was largely an outcome of the vulnerability of the 
state precisely at the juncture of production and subsequent exchange for 
other required goods. Those most actively engaged in these practices were 
therefore entrepreneurs and traders. 88 But since the informal economy grew 
in direct relationship to outcomes induced by government policies (low produc-
er prices, high costs, unrealistic foreign exchange rates and regulations), 
gradually most government employees, unemployed, commercial groups, and 
farmers became involved in this strategy. The key difference remained the 
extent to which beating the system became an accepted form of organized, as 
opposed to personal, behavior. In each of their manifestations the two types 
tended to work in inverse proportion, with the extent of internal organization 
in the informal economy reflecting the degree of disarray in the formal system. 
The most noticeable result of this survival technique was the establish-
ment of what has been called an Alice in Wonderland economy. "There are two 
economies side by side -- one reflecting world prices, the other artificial 
cedi prices. There are enormous profits to be made by buying in the 
official market and selling in the unofficial markets. For example a farmer 
can buy a bag of fertilizer at the official rate, smuggle it across the border 
to say, Upper Volta, sell the fertilizer, return with the empty bag, and sell 
the bag in Ghana for more than he paid for the bag and the fertilizer in the 
first place."89 
The effect of this dual system, established in no small measure to react 
to stagnation and deterioration and insupportable pricing and distribution 
policies, was to make virtually everyone who was in any way tangentially asso-
ciated with the system into a speculator, lawbreaker, corrupter or corruptee. 
The quest for survival thus directed energies into further undermining an 
already fragile economy by compounding the difficulties involved in its reha-
bilitation. 
Resort to the beat-the-system strategy therefore divested the economy of 
some of its gains during this period, and broke down elements of social cohe-
sion that had surrounded the state in prior years. Indeed, the establishment 
and buttressing of the informal economy took place directly at the expense of 
the state, and was fueled by divergent groups not always acting in unison. 
Those who employed the various tactics of beating the system acted for them-
selves (for producers, for traders, for class interests, for specific kin 
groups, or for their ethnic affines). In short, to beat the system they were 
compelled to put their specific group interests above those of the state. 
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Recourse to strategies of this sort evince a mixture of ingenuity and 
destructiveness which are difficult to either condone or condemn. The eradi-
cation of some of these practices by the AFRC under Rawlings, while striking 
out at the most obvious ills of the informal economy, did not in any way point 
to viable alternatives to this form of response to instability and under-
development, 90 short of rebuilding the entire economy from scratch. 
Ghanaians, however, quietly and competently devised a fourth, more posi-
tive and constructive survival technique which stressed adjustment and the 
refinement of alternatives (as opposed to substitutes) to both the formal and 
informal economy. This strategy, that of withdrawal and readjustment of modes 
of production, was founded on moving away from the uses and abuses entailed in 
working within, escaping, or counteracting the existing political economy. 
The withdrawal strategy has been predicated on finding new, or elaborating 
existing, means for self-reliance and autonomy without overtly depending on 
the government. This quest for self-sufficiency has been expressed in a num-
ber of areas, but has most notably centered on agriculture and its reorganiza-
tion as an ongoing basis for economic development. The most carefully 
documented example of the utilization of this strategy hails from the village 
of Hani in Brong-Ahafo. 91 The focus of agricultural production in Hani has 
shifted noticeably during the past decade. From an emphasis on export crops 
farmers have taken to growing foodstuffs, and particularly yams and tomatoes. 
Since fish has become unavailable, hunters have begun to set traps to augment 
the protein component of local diets. Imported cooking oil has become scarce, 
so people began to collect the locally available shea butter nut. As a logi-
cal by-product of these activities, certain crafts that had fallen into misuse 
were revived. The potter was back after an absence of some years, to make 
ceramic cooking utensils instead of the imported aluminum ones. The tinker 
regained prominence to fix implements, and even the blacksmith began to make 
agricultural implements (particularly cutlasses) that could not be found 
anywhere on the market. 
As self-sustained and designed productive activities increased, so, too, 
did amenities. The number of homes in !Jani jumped from 67 to 100 during the 
1970-1980 decade. Many of the new abodes were self-built. School attendance 
jumped by a full 100 percent. The population of the village increased at a 
rate 2. 7 times that of the national average, indicating that people were 
returning home, or not leaving the town in the first instance. All told, the 
rise in the cost of living was far less dramatic than in the cities, and con-
sumer goods were in greater abundance than they had been in the past. People 
in !Jani, and in neighboring Brong villages, perceived themselves to be better 
off in 1980 than they were in 1970. 
The increased productivity and rise in standard and quality of life evi-
dent in Hani was symptomatic of manifold self-reliant moves taking place in 
other parts of the country as well. Evidence of similar processes came from 
the Axim area in the western region.92 In the Volta region a gari factory, 
aimed at using alternate technology to maximize the gains of the local gari 
industry, brought to the fore the extent to which local resourcefulness had 
come into play during the decade under discussion. 93 In Asante and the 
north similar self-reliant mechanisms were well under way, and material was 
slowly being collated to indicate that the withdrawal survival alternative was 
taking on significant proportions. Individuals were even breaking away from 
paid employment and settling down to farming, cattle-raising and 
production.94 Techniques learned in managed agricultural schemes 




The quiet, efficient, self-propelled efforts highlighted, perhaps more 
forcefully than in the past, the fact that African farmers, and Ghanaian rural 
dwellers in particular, "show exceptional willingness to adapt or change their 
institutions to the requirements of economic development. Indeed, the African 
openness to innovation is comparable to, or even perhaps greater than, that of 
the Japanese and .t\merican in the past. "96 The oft-touted Ghanaian resource-
fulness was thus being used to create conditions, on a smaller scale than the 
state, for something more than survival. This reorientation to self-
sufficiency by means of withdrawal from the state-centered market economy thus 
assumed constructive meaning for the daily existence of many Ghanaians. 
The readjustment of means and modes of production was manifested also in 
other spheres of the political economy as well. Small-scale entrepreneurs who 
had had jobs as employees in the formal economy also began working on their 
own, and some were moving into manufacturing industries independent of the 
state. 97 Some businessmen were involved in textiles, in the arts, even in 
the beginnings of agro-industry. 98 The manufacturing sector, on a smaller 
scale again, was regaining a prominence of its own. So, too, were local 
markets, and trading activities that ignored political boundaries. Around 
these activities developed an infrastructure devised to meet the needs of 
local merchants. 99 The marketing of goods and also of services according to 
profit principles was enhanced by the fact that during this period governments 
could not prevent farmers from marketing their produce through their own chan-
nels, let alone force them to sell it to government agencies. The withdrawal 
process thus allowed even traders to find alternative opportunities in the 
informal sector.100 The extent of these activities could be seen by visit-
ing local villages and markets in the center of the country. 
Professionals, too, commenced to withdraw from the state sector, move to 
rural areas or away from Accra, and strike out on their own. This tendency 
was especially pronounced in the medical profession, but could be seen among 
midwives, dentists, architects and engineers. The concern for finding appro-
priate technologies to further bolster local-oriented autonomy manifested 
itself also in research orientations and in the palpable quest for finding 
technologies compatible with the new local self-reliance.101 
The withdrawal survival strategy thus consisted of creating self-propelled 
enclosures autonomous of the state, and as self-sufficient as possible under 
the circumstances. This creative self-encapsulation, unlike the previously 
treated survival strategies, was located predominantly in rural areas, and 
devised in the first instance to meet, as inventively as possible, the needs 
of the population in the countryside. Only at later stages does it appear to 
have been adapted as an internal escape strategy by urban groups. In this 
instance, then, class was less significant than community. Indeed, the dif-
ferences between tradition and modernity became increasingly insignificant as 
people came together in smaller groups and locations to meet the exigencies of 
the current situation.102 This type of banding together had been successful 
in the colonial period, and was revived again during the second decade of 
independence to counter similar constraints.103 
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Both the location and the composition of those involved in the withdrawal 
strategy, then, had precedents in the past, and were hardly surprising in 
light of the occupational make-up of Ghana's labor force. Slightly less that 
a fifth of Ghana's labor force are wage employees of any kind, and in 1960 37 
percent of salaried personnel were employed by the government. Thus only one 
in eight people in employment was connected with the capitalist mode of pro-
duction.104 When this began to fall apart in the 1970's, even that group 
reverted to peasant and even modified subsistence forms. The withdrawal of 
the peasant was also a response to actions taken in the formal sector. The 
reduction of food prices provided a very real disincentive to market goods 
through government channels. When the AFRC stringently enforced control 
prices, shipments of food to urban areas dropped even more dramatically.105 
By then, the withdrawal strategy had reached the stage where local economies 
could take advantage of or ignore government-sponsored measures, depending on 
the profitability of such moves. In short, these had achieved an autonomy 
economically which made their support of the economy of Ghana contingent upon 
favorable policies and tangible henefits.106 
The withdrawal strategy, although motivated by similar intentions, varied 
both in degree and in precise form from place to place within Ghana. Four 
main factors affected the exact nature of the resultant self-reliance pos-
ture. The first factor was the local basis of social stratification and land 
tenure. In some cases, as in the forest areas, the cocoa-producing company 
system or corporate family unit directly influenced the ability to disengage 
from the government system.107 In the north the more open access to free-
hold tenure generated greater social inequalities. The social basis of land 
ownership and production was therefore important in delineating the type of 
self-reliance effected. A second factor was an outgrowth not only of the 
existing mode of production, but of the specific market crops grown. The 
degree of withdrawal was less in areas producing irreversible foodstuffs 
(coconuts) than in semi-reversible crop areas (cocoa), which in turn was less 
than in totally reversible crop territories (groundnuts, cotton). In fact, 
autonomy could better be attained where the specificity of the cash product 
allowed also for food production, or for the total replacement of export with 
consumption goods. A third factor was situational. Regions closer to the 
market sector controlled by the state were more prone to disengage from 
governmental activities than areas considered to be disadvantaged. These 
latter were in any event more self-sufficient, and therefore contact with the 
state, for them, could mean incremental benefits that did not hamper their own 
self-reliance .108 And finally, the extent and nature of the disengagement 
strategy in particular areas was attested to by the content of symbolic organ-
izing principles at the local level. In some areas these were primarily of an 
ethnic sort (Volta), in others they had a regional quality (north, upper), and 
in many Akan areas they were marked by communal local features of a more 
heterogeneous variety. The patterning of the resultant autonomous and semi-
autonomous politico-economic units therefore varied as well. 
The effects of this last, innovative, disengagement strategy designed to 
confront the diminishing returns from association with the formal economy had 
several noticeable effects in the short term (longer-term repercussions are 
more difficult to assess at this point). First, for individuals, it was 
possible to maintain, and even in some cases to increase personal income. 
This was not always the case for services previously offered by the state, 
which still were underdeveloped in many rural areas. Second, by aligning 
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social, political, and economic processes in their own areas, local communi-
ties brought about not only a redrawing of the boundaries of their existence, 
but also began to create a new, modified form of self-reliance that drew on 
traditional patterns but simultaneously benefited from the injection of tech-
niques, knowledge and experience garnered from the state sector. And, for the 
state itself, the reaction to underdevelopment and incompetence further less-
ened the hold of the state apparatus on component units, and palpably altered 
the nature of power relations in the country. The conditionality of associa-
tion with the state which was characteristic of relations between locale and 
the government in the past was thereby magnified as conscious withdrawal from 
the state became an important coping mechanism in its own right. 
The four main strategies devised by Ghanaians to deal with an insufferable 
economic situation demonstrate the wide range of adjustment mechanisms that 
can be employed in an environment of diminishing circumstances. Here under-
development became the framework for interaction. Most groups and individuals 
in Ghana did not confine themselves to one coping mechanism alone, but tended, 
whenever possible, to maximize their options along the continuum of suffer-
manage, escape, beat the system, and disengagement. Within the scope of 
possibilities, some choices therefore included substitutes, and the final one 
constituted a full-fledged alternate political autonomy increasingly divorced 
from processes under the guidance, supervision, or control of the state. 
Almost always, the adoption of one or more of these strategies, occurring at 
different levels and with varying intensity, was a form of response to condi-
tions prevailing at that level. As such reactive approaches referred to 
governmental and external actions, but did not necessarily take place in that 
context or in any way imply that they depended on continuous contact with the 
government. Indeed, since these types of responses to Ghana's unique form of 
underdevelopment were determined by need, and hence far from being voluntary, 
their precise nature may be fully understood only by reference to the variable 
conditions that spawned them. The non-voluntary quality of these survival 
techniques therefore usually came hand in hand with a noticeable reduction in 
the quality of life, if not actually in personal income. Gains attained in 
the past fell by the wayside, expectations were reduced, and future possibili-
ties circumscribed. Nevertheless, both the substance and the heterogeneity of 
adjustment mechanisms underlined the creativity, ingenuity, and resourceful-
ness exhibited by many Ghanaians when confronted with challenges of an excru-
ciatingly confining sort.109 
The selection of a particular strategy was seen to be a function of, in 
the first instance, the kind of contact with the government and the political 
economy it managed as these affected specific groups and areas. The gradual 
curtailment of opportunities for participation by most groups, the dwindling 
of allocations, by the close of the decade, to virtually every segment of the 
population, and the breakdown of institutionalized linkage structures was 
common to most people. The reaction to this contact, however, differed 
according to a set of well-defined variables. First, situational factors were 
prominent. Urban dwellers chose different strategies than residents in the 
rural sector. Mobility, between urban and rural areas and between Ghana and 
other countries, also influenced the range of choice open to the individual. 
Second, the predominant principle of social stratificaion also affected the 
selection of certain strategies above others. In the towns and cities class 
factions and ethnic affinities were a determinant of no mean consequence. In 
some rural areas divisions between strangers and indigenous inhabitants was a 
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key; in others ethnic factors intervened, and still in other rural locations 
traditional principles of social stratification came to the fore. Situational 
and stratification variables were accompanied, third, by prevailing modes of 
production and the relative reversibility of specific items produced. Where 
capitalist modes had become ingrained and access to the land limited, people 
opted to beat the system, escape it or succumb. Where peasant modes were 
operative and items of production permitted reversibility, disengagement at 
differing rates took place. And, finally, symbolic referents deriving from 
cultural orientations also influenced response decisions. Thus, group-related 
factors and norms help to account for the diversity of forms that the dynamic 
responses to underdevelopment took in different parts of the country. The 
significance of the isolation of these variables lies not only in their utili-
ty in understanding ongoing processes, but also in their value as indicators 
of patterns of response and change in the future as well as in the past.110 
The results of the utilization and consequent entrenchment of these 
differential modes of coping were twofold. On the one hand, a process of 
gradual withdrawal from the state began to emerge during the 1969-1979 phase. 
Unlike problems of integration at the beginning of independence which required 
incorporation, the movement reflected a very real attempt to move away from 
already achieved incorporation because of the malfunctioning of the govern-
ment. This internal self-reliance contrasted sharply with the virtual power 
disaggregation at the state level. The state appeared to have lost control of 
resources (symbolic, communal, material, and possibly even coercive). It also 
became less relevant to main groups throughout the country. This, coupled 
with its functional incapacity, wrought a lack of institutionalization that 
was severe, everywhere present, and in itself counterproductive to the contin-
ued distinctiveness of the government. It was not so much that the government 
ceased to exist (its external relevance was particularly important), but that 
it retained its prominence for a constantly diminishing circle. The closer 
alignment of a multiplicity of resources with specific groups and delineated 
tasks enhanced, at the same time, the centrality of institutions located else-
where. Thus, embracing strategies of survival to cope with Ghana's political 
economy brought about the self-enclosure of many Ghanaians from the influence 
of the state; and accounted for the redistribution and reallocation of income 
from the formal to the informal sector. 
The adoption of a series of adjustment techniques highlights the centrali-
ty of the dynamism inherent in tracing the processes of contact and response 
in specific environments. This action-reaction is important on three counts. 
First, it elucidates both the nature and direction of change in given situa-
tions. Second, it places internal reactions as the central determinant of 
change. And third, it effectively links development to the relative ability 
to manipulate the environment at a variety of regional, and down to the sub-
regional and local units.111 By tying ways of dealing with underdevelopment 
in Ghana to actual strategies of survival, it is possible not only to fill the 
vacuum created by the deterioration of the political economy generally (albeit 
through the palpable regressions of demands, expectations and standards), but 
also to shed some further light on the reasons for the decline of the economic 
situation during the period between 1969 and 1979. 
Practical and Theoretical Implications 
The concomitant processes of decline and survival have important implica-
tions, theoretically and practically. The policy ramifications have required, 
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initially, a decision as to whether to deal with the causes for, or with the 
manifestations of adjusting to Ghana's declining political economy. In most 
instances attempts have been made to tackle the reasons for underdevelopment 
rather than the concrete responses to the condition. In general, the propos-
als for causality rectification have followed the lines of the various schools 
of thought on Ghana's economic decline. 
The first approach, used by all Ghanaian administrators since 1978, has 
been to deal with changing the thrust of policies. The Akuffo government 
sought to apply stringent controls on the economy. These efforts were partly 
buttressed by Rawlings. The Limann government, during the first year of the 
Third Republic, chose to impose partial controls through monitoring pricing of 
commodities and policing retail outlets. It also slapped heavy taxes on 
foreign travel, stringent supervision of foreign exchange, and launched an 
agricultural development program.112 Funds for the underwriting of these 
investments were sought from the IMF and IBRD, and from foreign concerns. 
Particular efforts were made to attract capital for the upgrading and expan-
sion of mineral production (mostly gold, but also for prospecting for gas, 
oil, and bauxite) .113 In all these efforts the stress has been laid on 
using policy measures and improved implementation to resuscitate the political 
economy of Ghana along lines determined by liberal pragmatic approaches, and 
requiring good government to confront contemporary conditions. 
The result of these moves has not been as significant as the governments 
in question would have liked. The holding operation has provided few solu-
tions, but probably also assisted in avoiding total collapse. Akuffo, and 
Limann after him, found themselves devoting more and more attention to intrac-
table urban, middle class problems, which have come to relate to a diminishing 
proportion of the population. 
Some observers and critics have claimed that the required policy measures 
emanate from the readings imputed by the dependency-underdevelopment analysis. 
They have themselves suggested that what is needed is a policy that would set 
in motion a disengagement of Ghana from its global structural dependency, 
while at the same time furnishing the state coffers (through higher world 
prices for Ghanaian exports and increased aid from the industrialized world) 
with a larger supply of capitaI.114 This structural approach, which demands 
greater militancy on the international front, has found a growing number of 
adherents. However, despite the logic inherent in such structural transforma-
tion, the approach neglects immediate needs and demands that can hardly await 
the implementation of this option. 
A third possible policy approach has suggested that Ghana, in order to 
rehabilitate its economy, must undergo a structural cum normative reordering 
that would change the social bases of control of thestate apparatus, modify 
social relations of production, and inevitably also bring about, in a revised 
Marxist version, greater penetration.115 At this juncture, however, the 
practical obstacles to putting such a policy in motion, should the leaders be 
found who were willing to pursue it, seem monumental. 
The three policy preferences emanating from a causality-linked analysis of 
the reasons for Ghana's economic decline exhibit a number of drawbacks. 
First, many proposals are either too scanty or too grandiose to permit effec-
tive implementation. Second, and more seriously, these approaches all suffer 
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from the fact that they do not take into account ongoing survival strategies. 
A curious bifurcation of formal government energies has resulted: on the one 
hand schemes are designed and measures formulated to deal with the situation 
in its entirety, and on the other hand real activities have tended to focus on 
quashing strikes, finding skilled workers, curtailing smuggling, prohibiting 
mobility, and repressing opposition. In other words, policy derived from an 
understanding of any of the standard reasons for Ghana's underdevelopment 
overlooks real conditions and behavior patterns on the ground, and therefore 
loses much of its utility. And third, the various approaches do presume a 
certain correlation between state power and resource control which is not 
necessarily correct. 
Indeed, the injection of the notion of state power with a direct link to 
certain material resources obfuscated both the nature of power at the state's 
disposal and the extent of its control over critical resources. The state in 
Ghana has, to a large extent, forfeited functions deriving from an ability to 
aggregate normative and participatory community resources. It has also had to 
deal with dwindling national resources, and its penetrative capability has 
been so limited that in effect it has been unable to use coercive repression 
on a prolonged basis.116 The distinctiveness of the state, if it existed at 
all, was, in 1980, marked mostly by its provision of a vague focus for symbolic 
identity, for national pride, and by a certain regulatory-organizational 
potential. In these circumstances, and particularly in light of the fact that 
disengagement strategies had been activated in a variety of ways, the real 
options open to the governments were constrained by the problem of power 
extension. In this framework, therefore, the concrete choices would appear to 
stem neither from authority nor from resource control, but rather from the 
attempt to maximize the service and administrative capabilities at the state's 
disposal. 
The policy implications of addressing not so much the causes, but the 
survival mechanisms formulated to adjust to Ghana's underdevelopment may, 
conceivably, go in two directions. In the first instance, it suggests the 
possibility of governmental reinforcement of local self-reliance efforts. 
Most governments, and particularly the Busia and Acheampong regimes, have 
shunned such an approach: "there is simply little or no policy in many 
regimes to connect or utilize the structure of traditional society and life to 
economic development. What references there are to tribes and villages are 
negative, seeing them as practically hindering government objectives. "117 
By acknowledging existing behavioral patterns and the local structures through 
which they have been mediated, and by recognizing that policy must be tied to 
social structures and modes of production rather than to state institutions, 
it might be possible to institute policies geared not only to increasing local 
self-sufficiency, but to regulating the de-concentration of structures as 
well. In this way, the state would move from a rather futile quest for con-
trol of the means of production (land and labor, still the most important of 
these, are well beyond the purview of the state) to the position of regulating 
these means.118 
Another tack, aimed more directly also at maximizing state supervision, 
could focus more squarely on the linkage network, and on enhancing its utility 
both to those concerned with disengagement and those concentrating on the need 
to fortify the state. Here a number of policy possibilities come to mind. 
These include the regulation of seasonal migration,119 the provision of 
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improved training for middle level manpower,120 the fixing of produce prices 
to attract marketing through official channels, and the more equitable dis-
bursement of goods and services through infrastructure fortification by formal 
mechanisms. Structurally, too, the buttressing of intermediate structures 
through the de-centralization of state-related decision-making processes could 
allow the formal apparatus to supplement autonomous trends at exactly the 
point where the benefits of self-reliance have been most regressive -- those 
of quality of life, infrastructure, and service disbursement. 
For those concerned with the maintenance of the state framework, the 
implications of the choice between relying on local ingenuity and creating 
more coherent linkage structures are quite different. In the self-reliant 
approach, the possibility exists that the state would orchestrate its own 
dissolution. But in the second possibility, the state could retain a not 
insignificant distinctiveness in areas of regulation and organization. 
Although this is a far cry from the state power that it has sought to attain, 
it nevertheless is more compatible with ongoing processes, with the interests 
of those involved in the more constructive survival strategies, and with a 
realistic assessment of developmental potential based on the notion of small, 
relative, increments in the ability to manipulate the environment. 
The ramifications of dealing, from a practical perspective, with uprooting 
the causes of underdevelopment as opposed to tackling the behavioral adjust-
ments of this process are therefore quite distinct. There is little doubt 
that Ghanaian governments have preferred the first course in the past, and in 
all likelihood will continue to do so in the future. But given the con-
straints, both external and internal, placed on the government's ability to 
act, it is not beyond the stretch of the imagination to see considerably more 
attention devoted to exploring the possibilities of a reduction of govern-
mental expectations and activities, in keeping both with the survival achieve-
ments and needs of Ghanaians and with the state's own power limitations. 
The theoretical implications of the review of the practical uses of power 
also require some comment. The story of the decline of Ghana's political 
economy and the adjustments made to meet these exigencies does not conform to 
the results that may be expected from the use of established modes of analy-
sis. The issues encompassed by extending the range of topics covered by the 
functional components of the Ghanaian political scene, within the framework of 
a political economy analysis, have meant that the reactions to Ghana's eco-
nomic crises take on a more prominent position in the investigation. Hence, 
by re-drawing relative emphases, these responses also affect the conclusions 
that may be elicited from such a study. In other words, by looking not only 
at the roots of underdevelopment, but also at the processes it itself caused, 
it is possible to better comprehend patterns of ongoing change as well as the 
directions that these changes have taken. The establishment of a dynamic 
aimed at uncovering both the underpinnings of conditions and the responses to 
them inevitably incorporates a wider range of units of analysis. Indeed, the 
mode of analysis employed herein, once the problem has been reformulated, 
demands the use of units ranging from the global system down to the individual. 
The state must deal, or react, to global conditions, just as groups and 
locales in turn react to the state. This coping of units with conditions 
wrought by their next level of reference sets in motion a new set of circum-
stances which must then be accomodated. 
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Not only do the issues, units, and modes of analysis entail rethinking, so 
too do the conceptual foci of discussion. Ghana's economic deterioration 
during the 1970's and the means devised to adjust to this situation hinged on 
a variety of factors related to the uses and abuses of power. The practice of 
politics at the state level came, gradually, to tackle a contracting range of 
topics with diminishing effectiveness. The scope of the uses of power, there-
fore, narrowed during the course of the decade, and the state came to monopo-
lize fewer and fewer spheres of activity as people devised their own independ-
ent means of dealing with their situation. Thus, in turn, the power of the 
state underwent further deflation as the resources at its disposal waned. 
Ghana remained (and for that matter still is) a rich country, but it is not 
the absolute quantity of the country's resources which is of importance, but 
the relative amount attached to the state, the way these resources are used 
(or abused), by whom, and to what end. The state's resources, on a relative 
basis, diminished as a result of mismanagement, external factors, and loss of 
confidence by major portions of the population. The capacity of the state to 
cope with certain problems or to control and direct behavior was circumscribed 
at the outset by the limited meanings (mostly material) it attached to 
resources. As time progressed, it became further constrained as its capabili-
ties to manage even these resources diminished. Thus, the uses of power were 
limited by the relative reduction in the resources that the state could accu-
mulate over time. Since internal material resources came, together with 
normative and social ones, to be concentrated at various local points, power 
was disbursed and reapportioned throughout the countryside at the same time. 
These concomitant power-related processes reflected the two-fold trend of 
economic deterioration and self-reliance mechanisms which were taking place 
during this period. 
It appears, therefore, that the constraints placed on state power are a 
function of the systematic dissipation, in a short time span, of the material 
goods it did oversee. The relative reduction in availability (often through 
incompetence) was significant in that it contracted the spheres of influence 
of successive governments on the political economy of Ghana, and even further 
reduced the hold of the state, indeed its positive relevance, for much of what 
was going on in the country at the time. 
The process, then, of policy formulation, implementation, outcome, reac-
tion strategies, and direction of changes may be linked integrally to the 
relationship between groups, resources, power and the state. The redistribu-
tion effected through the problematic use of power in itself induced further 
disengagement from the state rubric. The functional uses of power, therefore, 
limited by resource manipulation of an unfortunate kind, set in train patterns 
that placed most resources, and hence power bases, beyond the reach of the 
state. The state center became effectively embedded in its environment, and, 
lacking salience either symbolically, communally, or functionally, it lost its 
relative autonomy. In the Busia years the loss of autonomy stemmed from the 
inability of leaders to disengage from certain ethnic and class interests. In 
the SMC period the loss of autonomy resulted from the lack of accountability 
of the leaders to any broad groups. The result in both cases, however, was to 
create the conditions for the dissolution of much of the state apparatus with-
in the boundaries of the country. 
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Source: World Bank, Ghana Economic Memorandum (April, 1979), pp. 14-17. 
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Table II 
The Ghanaian Cocoa Industry 
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 
Production (000 metric tons) 340.0 
Producer Price (Cedi/metric ton) 436.0 
Net Payments to Farmers 
(million Cedis) 148.2 
Value of Cocoa Production--
Nominal (million Cedis at 
Official Rate) 424.l 
Value of Cocoa Production--
Real (million Cedis at 
Shadow Rate) 530.1 
Average Tax Rate Percent 
(official exchange rate) 65.l 
Average Tax Rate Percent 








396.0 320.0 277.0 
597.0 747.0 1,333.0 
236.4 245.8 369.3 
604.3 830.0 1,189.7 
858.1 1,767.9 4,568.4 
60.9 70.4 69,0 
72.5 86,1 92,0 

















Other (incl. Gov't) 
GDP at Constant Market 
Prices 
Table III 
Origin of Gross Domestic Product (1973-1978) 











































































































1 Preliminary estimates. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra. 
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